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Dissonance on the Brexit menu: What does Britain want to eat?   
 
Ronald Ranta, Department of Politics, Kingston University, London 
 
This article focuses on the future of food in the UK in the context of Brexit. It examines the 
claims and promises made by Brexiteers before the referendum and juxtaposes these with the 
approach pursued by the Conservative-led government since. The article argues that there is a 
clear dissonance between the two. This dissonance is the result of two important factors. First, 
the government is stuck in a non-decision making mode, making it unable to pursue clear 
policies. Second, the food claims and promises made by Brexiteers are in opposition to what 
the vast majority of the public, food experts, farmers and food businesses want. Through 
exploring these two factors, and the Brexiteers claims and promises, the article explains what 
leaving the EU might mean for the future of food in the UK.   
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What about food? 
 
Unlike immigration and sovereignty, food did not feature heavily in the run up to Britain’s 
European Union (EU) membership referendum in 2016. Food did come up briefly in post-
referendum negotiations between the UK and the EU, particularly with regard to Northern 
Ireland. However, it only became an issue of public concern when reports of a potential US-
UK free trade agreement (FTA) appeared in the media, mostly in relation to controversial US 
farm practices, and with regard to the short-term implications of a no deal Brexit. The lack of 
discussion regarding food occurred despite the fact that the long-term ‘implications of Brexit 
for food are potentially enormous’ and this applies regardless of which form of Brexit is 
adopted.1 From the price, choice and standards of the food available to the health and 
sustainability of UK farming and food supply chains, Brexit has the potential for dramatically 
altering the way food is governed and dealt with, but also what people will shop and eat.  
Despite the fact that food was barely discussed in the run up to the referendum, leading 
proponents of leaving the EU (Brexiteers) did advance a number of food related arguments; 
Vote Leave (the official leave campaign) had a section on its website dedicated to farming, 
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fisheries and food. Brexiteers highlighted a number of areas in which they claimed EU 
membership hurt British consumers, food businesses and farmers. They also put forward policy 
recommendations and ideas regarding the future of agriculture and food post-Brexit. One of 
the main arguments advanced was that it would be advantageous for the UK to leave EU 
regulatory bodies and frameworks. In terms of food, they argued that such a move would 
include the possibility of setting British own food standards, improving agricultural 
productivity, reducing unnecessary red tape, bringing down food prices, and pursuing FTAs 
with major food producers, such as the US and Australia.  
The claims made by Brexiteers present a particular vision of the future of food in the UK post-
Brexit. When this vision is juxtaposed with the approaches pursued by the Conservative led 
government, its negotiating team with the EU and the Department for environment, food and 
rural affairs (DEFRA), an apparent contradiction appears. There is a clear dissonance between 
the pre-referendum promises and the post-referendum reality. By trying to clarify why this is 
the case, this article highlights and clarifies the benefits, trade-offs and costs associated with 
Brexit and explains what leaving the EU might mean for the future of food in the UK.   
 
Brexit menu 
According to the Guardian newspaper, during the 2019 Conservative party leadership contest, 
Boris Johnson claimed that the EU imposed ‘pointless, pointless, expensive, environmentally 
damaging health and safety’ regulations and requirements on UK food businesses. Johnson 
gave the example of the costs incurred by a kipper (smoked whole herring) producer from the 
Isle of Man who had to add a small ‘plastic ice pillow’ to each kipper sent by post. There was 
one small problem with Johnson’s example, the specific requirement to keep food cold while 
in transport from the producer to the costumer did not come from the EU. It is based on the 
advice of the UK’s Food Standard Agency (FSA), which states on its website that ‘foods that 
need refrigerating must be kept cool while they are being transported’. The FSA, however, 
does not specifically require the need for plastic ice pillows.  
The claim that EU food regulations are mostly pointless and place undue burden on UK food 
businesses is one that has been repeatedly made by leading Brexiteers. The opposition to, and 
at times ridicule of EU regulations has also been a feature of the British tabloid press for 
decades. In many ways, the story of the kipper’s ‘plastic ice pillows’ is part of a long list of 
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misleading and inaccurate food related claims made by the tabloid press. These claims include 
the assertions that under EU regulations cod will no longer be labeled as cod; Bombay mix will 
be renamed Mumbai mix; the Union Jack flag will be banned from British meat exports; 
Caerphilly cheese production in Caerphilly will end; and brandy butter will be renamed brandy 
spreadable fat.2 Stories such as these have helped shape British public opinion towards the EU, 
which has created a dissonance between the work done by the EU on issues concerning food 
security, safety and standards, and the general public’s perception of the EU.  
In the run up to the referendum, the leave campaign argued that EU rules and regulations were 
hampering and restricting British farming and food businesses. Several rules and regulations 
were particularly highlighted. These included rules on the use of pesticides; the ban on 
genetically modified (GM) food and feed; and rules on labelling. On its website, Vote Leave 
argued that rules on pesticides deny ‘business access to innovative crop protection products. 
This hinders EU businesses in their efforts to improve crop yields and quality’. The rules on 
GM food were claimed to hinder British farmers’ competitiveness in the global market. It was 
argued that rules on labeling ‘imposed silly requirements’ on and added unnecessary costs to 
UK businesses. In short, Vote Leave claimed that EU rules and regulations did little for 
consumer safety and animal welfare, harmed jobs, ‘cost farmers millions, destroy businesses, 
and harm the environment’.  
It was not simply EU rules and regulations that Vote leave and leading Brexiteers were unhappy 
with. They were unhappy with the EU’s overall approach to food and in particular its Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP, which consumes over a third of the EU’s budget, is meant to 
support European farmers and rural communities, through a system of direct payments and 
subsidies, and help secure food prices and supplies, among other things. Brexiteers claimed 
that CAP was bad for UK farmers, expensive, wasteful and bureaucratic, and imposed punitive 
tariffs against third world countries. George Eustice, who at the time of the referendum was 
the Minister of State for agriculture, fisheries and food, and who campaigned for Brexit, argued 
that it would be better for UK farmers to be out of CAP as it was stifling and wasteful, and that 
they would be better off receiving subsidies from the UK government. Another leading 
Brexiteer, the Conservative MP Owen Paterson, who had previously served as the Secretary of 
State for environment, food and rural affairs, argued that only by leaving the EU and CAP 
would the UK be able to increase farm output and work with like-minded countries to combat 
plant and animal diseases. According to Vote Leave, leaving the EU would allow the UK to 
decide its own rural and agricultural policies; pursue FTAs, which they claimed would benefit 
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British farmers and consumers; increase food production and farm productivity; and lower food 
prices.  
The subject of food prices is interesting to examine because it is the most tangible one, as it 
directly affects consumers, and was one of the few food-related issues broached by both sides 
of the referendum campaign. During the referendum, Vote Leave claimed that Brexit would 
lead to cheaper food prices. The basis for the claim was that lower food prices would be 
achieved through a two-pronged approach. First, it was claimed that greater competitiveness 
in the food sector coupled with increased farm productivity, through economies of scale and a 
reduction in unnecessary and costly rules and regulations would bring down domestic prices. 
Second, it was claimed that imported food prices would also be brought down through new 
FTAs with leading food producing countries, which would be accompanied by lower tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers. Daniel Hannan, a Conservative member of the European Parliament 
(MEP), and a prominent Brexiteer and free trade advocate, argued that much of the EU’s food 
standards and regulations were barriers to trade that had little ‘genuine public health 
justification’. Removing these would therefore bring down food prices and pose no risk. It was 
also claimed that future FTAs would include many developing countries, which would benefit 
directly; this was put against the charge that EU trade policies and practices were particularly 
unfair towards developing countries.  
Stronger IN, the official remain campaign, as well as the National Farmers Union (NFU), 
argued that only continued membership of the EU would provide the UK with access to cheap 
food. Stronger In argued that ‘Being in the EU means you pay less for your weekly food shop’, 
while the NFU warned that leaving would make ‘it more expensive to feed your family’. The 
reason put forward was that leaving the EU would entail higher tariffs and trade barriers 
between the UK and the EU, from which the UK imports around 30 per cent of its food. Leaving 
would also make farmers dependent on exports to the EU worse off, as 60 per cent of UK food 
exports go to the EU.3 It was also argued that leaving the EU would precipitate a drop in the 
value of the pound, which would reduce the amount of money families had to spend.  
Interestingly, the debate over food prices is similar to the one the UK had during the 1975 
referendum on its membership of the European Community (EC), the precursor to the EU. The 
debate then, as is today, concerned the fact that the UK was not self-sufficient in food and 
required imports for its food security. In their official leaflets, the In campaign in 1975 – in 
favor of staying in the EC – argued that ‘Britain, as a country which cannot feed itself, will be 
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safer in the Community which is almost self-sufficient in food’, and that only membership of 
the EC would guarantee food security and ‘secure food at fair prices’. The OUT campaign 
argued that food prices would ‘rise higher and higher’ because of inefficient EC food 
regulations and bureaucracy and the UK’s inability to pursue its own food policies, including 
pursuing FTAs with other food producing countries.  
There are a number of points that arise from this debate. First, since the 1975 referendum, UK 
food imports now account for half the food eaten in the country, much of which comes from 
the EU, but UK households spend only 8 per cent of their budget on food (this excludes eating 
out), a percentage that is one of the lowest in the world.4 A second point to consider is that 
lowering food prices might undercut UK farmers and force structural changes on UK farming. 
Lastly, lower food prices might not necessarily be in the interest of UK farmers or the general 
public, particularly ‘if they are at odds with either environmental sustainability or positive 
health outcomes’.5  
 
A green Brexit?! 
During the referendum, Brexiteers put forward their vision for the future of food in the UK 
post-Brexit. The UK would become, to paraphrase Boris Johnson, a new Singapore on the 
Thames, a global free-trading economy with low food tariffs and few non-tariff barriers, low 
regulations, and increased consumer choice. UK domestic food sector would benefit from the 
removal of wasteful and inefficient EU subsidies; and changes to the rules and regulations that 
govern the use of food labeling, GM and pesticides, among many others things, will encourage 
greater competition and higher productivity. What is striking, however, in the aftermath of the 
referendum, is how far removed the Conservative government’s rhetoric, negotiated position 
and actual proposals, under Theresa May (July 2016- July 2019), have been from this vision.  
In its negotiations with the EU, the May government pursued a somewhat contradictory 
approach. On the one hand, it aimed to keep the UK in regulatory alignment with EU, which 
would have meant closely following EU food standards, rule and regulations. On the other 
hand, it tried to ensure its ability to pursue FTAs with leading food producing countries. This 
approach crystallised on the 6th of July 2018 with the Chequers Plan. While the plan did not 
specifically address food it aimed at establishing a common rule book for agricultural products 
and maintaining overall high regulatory standards. The Chequers Plan, and its perceived 
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deviation from pre-referendum promises, prompted the resignation of several Brexit supporting 
ministers, among them the Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and the Brexit Secretary David 
Davis. Chequers in the eyes of the Brexiteers would make a mockery of Brexit and, by pursuing 
regulatory alignment, deny Britain the opportunity to break away from EU rules and 
regulations and negotiate new FTAs.    
Despite criticism from the Brexit supporting press and Conservative back benchers, the 
government solidified its position, and its departure from the pre-referendum Brexit vision, 
with its support for the Withdrawal Agreement (WA), which was approved by the cabinet on 
the 14th of November 2018. The WA confirmed that the UK would remain in close regulatory 
alignment with the EU in order to ensure that there would be no hard border between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland. Additionally, the government agreed that until additional measures were 
found to ensure an open border, Northern Ireland would remain in the Customs Union and large 
parts of the Single Market, implying that many EU food regulations and rules would persist. 
May’s insistence that Northern Ireland would not be treated differently from the rest of the 
country meant that the same rules and regulations would apply to the UK as a whole even after 
Brexit.   
Another important aspect of the WA was the agreement by both sides to recognise and legally 
protect the existing stock of EU-approved geographical indications (GIs), which include 
protected designation of origin, protected geographical indications, and traditional specialities, 
until a final Brexit agreement was concluded. The EU’s GI framework treats food that is 
produced in a particular region, or has been produced in a particular way, as intellectual 
property. There are more than 3000 GIs in place at the moment, which include, among others, 
a wide range of wines, pastries, cheeses, and cured meat. The agreement would have covered 
and benefited the several dozen GIs of UK origins, such as Welsh lamb, Melton Mowbray pork 
pie, Cornish clotted cream, Jersey Royal potatoes, Arbroath smokies, Cornish pasty, and Scotch 
whisky. Besides playing an important role for local and regional food producers and 
communities, GIs also have an important role in FTAs; the EU includes the protection of its 
GIs in its FTAs. Any decision by the UK to legally recognise EU GIs might, to an extent, 
complicate future FTAs as well as limit the range of products that could be included.   
The WA also included a transitional period up until December 2020. During the transitional 
period all relevant EU rules and regulations and the supremacy of EU regulatory bodies were 
expected to continue. The UK was expected during this period to design, and afterwards apply 
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a new legislative framework for food regulations and to setup new UK only regulatory bodies. 
The WA precipitated another round of resignations among Brexit supporting ministers, among 
them the Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab, who had replaced Davis in July.  
The WA and the Chequers Plan demonstrated a deviation from the pre-referendum promises. 
However, nowhere was this deviation as stark as the pursuit, by Michael Gove the Secretary of 
State for environment, food and rural affairs (DEFRA) and leading Brexiteer, of a ‘Green 
Brexit’. The pursuit of a Green Brexit put to question the whole premise of lowering food 
standards, and eliminating rules and regulations regarding GM products and pesticides among 
other things. It also put to question the entire Brexiteer rationale of leaving the EU and taking 
back control.  
In February 2018, DEFRA published its post-Brexit consultation paper titled ‘Health and 
harmony: the future for food, farming and the environment in a green brexit’. In the foreword 
to the paper Gove argued that during the UK’s membership of the EU, and while inside CAP, 
its ‘environment has deteriorated, productivity has been held back and public health has been 
compromised’. Brexit, according to Gove, presented the UK with an opportunity not to lower 
food and agricultural standards but to raise them. The term high standards appears dozens of 
times in the paper, in relation to animal health and welfare, the environment and consumers. In 
its Green Brexit paper, DEFRA envisioned farmers as stewards of the environment that would 
be rewarded through a new subsidy system. The new subsidy system, which would replace the 
CAP one, would see a reduction in subsidies, particularly for larger farms, and future payments 
linked to environmental land management. Through this new system farmers would be required 
to provide better animal welfare and plant health standards; enhance and protect the 
environment; increase biodiversity; and mitigate climate change impacts; while improving 
productivity and competitiveness. On the issue of pesticides, the paper states the importance of 
strong regulations, to limit the risks, and ‘using all available tools to protect crops, with the 
least possible use of pesticides’. The document does not directly address the issue of GM crops 
other than to list gene editing as one of a range of innovations that would lead to higher farm 
productivity.  
While not specifically affirming his approval of the Green Brexit initiative, since taking office 
on 24th July 2019, Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson has stated his support for the 
work done by DEFRA and Gove; he has also reappointed George Eustice, a strong advocate 
of a Green Brexit, as the Minister of State for agriculture, fisheries and food. Johnson has also 
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stated in an open letter to the NFU that he would not undermine Britain’s ‘own high domestic 
production standards’, and according to the Farmers Guardian newspaper has claimed he would 
look to ‘boost standards’ and ‘enhance consumer safety’.  
 
No appetite for Non-decision making 
The idea of pursuing a Green Brexit – of maintaining or improving food and animal welfare 
standards and providing better environmental stewardship – coupled with the WA, which keeps 
the UK in close regulatory alignment with the EU, is surprising given the statements made by 
Brexiteers regarding agricultural productivity, food prices, and FTAs. It raises two important 
questions regarding food and Brexit. First, if the UK wishes to maintain high food and animal 
welfare standards and remain in close regulatory alignment with the EU, which would make it 
harder for it to sign FTAs, why does it want to leave the EU? The Green Brexit approach would 
make it harder to dramatically increase productivity or lower food prices. Second, it raises the 
question of why the May government’s approach differed from the pre-referendum vision put 
forward by Brexiteers.  
Before answering these questions it is important to add a crucial caveat to the above discussion 
on a Green Brexit. While the consultation paper presented a particular approach towards the 
future of farming and agriculture in the UK, the implementation of much of the 
recommendations will depend on, yet to be created, new regulatory bodies and frameworks. 
With the current level of uncertainty, the chances of a no deal Brexit, and lack of drive towards 
setting up new regulatory bodies, the Green Brexit paper could end up as nothing more than an 
aspirational wish list rather than actual policy; the lack of substance and detail in DEFRA’s 
follow on Agricultural Bill 2017-2019 gives credence to this view.  
In addressing the reasons why the May government appeared to have pursued a different 
approach to food and agriculture after Brexit there are two important issues to consider. First, 
neither the government’s approach nor the various statements made by leading Brexiteers pre 
and post the referendum amount to a clear and comprehensive strategy of addressing the future 
of food in the UK, and this includes the new Johnson government as will be discussed below.  
The current vision of a Green Brexit appears to be a continuation of the approach taken by the 
coalition government (Liberal Democrat-Conservative Coalition 2010-2015). The Coalition 
Government’s stated policy document regarding food and farming (2012-2015) supported ‘a 
10 
 
strong and sustainable green economy’, the need to ‘enhance the environment and biodiversity’ 
and ‘encourage sustainable food production’. The suggestions put forward included many 
issues, such as food waste, food supply chains, skill shortages and diet and consumption, not 
addressed by either the May or Johnson governments. After the 2015 elections, the elected 
Conservative government launched a round of consultations on a proposed new 25 year plan 
on the future of food and farming. One would imagine that this would have loosely followed 
the Coalition Government’s policy, while encouraging further liberalisation. Brexit, however, 
changed all of that. The government did not expect to lose the referendum and therefore did 
not set out in any detail its post-Brexit food policies.  
According to Farmers Weekly, in response to questions, during the 2016 Oxford Farming 
Conference, and before the referendum, the then DEFRA Secretary Liz Truss referred to Brexit 
as a ‘leap in the dark’, and claimed the government was ‘not working on an alternative plan for 
the country’s farm sector in case the UK votes to leave the EU’. George Eustice, the then 
Minister of State for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, later qualified that statement by arguing 
that some policies were being outlined, specifically around subsidies. Nevertheless, the general 
impression given was that there was no clear post-Brexit policy on the future of food, or for 
that matter with regard to anything.  
In terms of Vote Leave and the leading Brexiteers, while they had a number of neoliberal 
slogans, they never presented a clear vision for food in the UK post-Brexit. There was a lot of 
rhetoric about the benefits of lowering food prices and tariffs, increasing trade and cutting red 
tape, but rarely did they discuss the costs and tradeoffs of these suggestions. They also rarely 
addressed the main food-related issues the UK was actually facing. There was no discussion 
on issues such as food waste, increasing use of food banks, or the worrying levels of 
malnutrition, hunger and obesity in the UK. For example, the rise in use of food banks is not 
an issue that could be resolved simply through lower food prices, but is the result of poverty, 
changes to the benefits system, and the impact of years of austerity.6 Additionally, there has 
been little information on how food insecurity in the UK would be addressed post-Brexit. In 
its July 2018 report, the UK Stakeholders for Sustainable Development stated that the 
government ‘is failing to address malnutrition in all forms, with food insecurity and obesity 
rising’ and that levels of adult and child food insecurity were among the worst, ‘if not the 
worst’, in Europe.7  
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The lack of clear policy was not only a feature of the pre-referendum leave campaign, the 2017 
elected Conservative minority government did not bring forward a clear and coherent long-
term vision with regard to food in the UK post-Brexit. The overall uncertainty regarding Brexit, 
and being a minority government, made it hard to put forward let alone implement coherent 
policies on any issue. In many ways the government was and still is caught in a classic case of 
non-decision making.  
The concept of non-decision refers to ‘the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision 
making to safe issues’ resulting ‘in suppression or thwarting of a latent challenge to the values 
or interests of the decision maker’.8 Non-decisions are normally associated with coalition 
governments and paralysis of the decision-making process. Decision making in these 
circumstances becomes ad-hoc and short-termism with policy makers pursuing often diverging 
agendas.9 This appears to be the case with the May government’s attempt to satisfy ministers 
dreaming of a ‘Singapore on the Thames’ and those pursuing a ‘Green Brexit’, while, at the 
same time, negotiating with and being pressured by the EU. In short, the government cannot 
afford to decide, because any decision has the potential of derailing Brexit and reducing the 
government’s scope for manoeuvre.  
The lack of a clear policy is also apparent with regard to the newly established Johnson 
government, which appears intent on saying all things to all people. While speaking of boosting 
productivity, enhancing efficiency, and pursuing free trade agreements with leading food 
exporting countries, in particular with the US, Johnson has also claimed to support sustainable 
growth, high domestic standards and increased consumer safety. With regard to a no deal 
Brexit, while Johnson has promised to support farmers and food businesses, he has provided 
little substance on what the implications his approach would have on food in the UK.  
The second main reason why May’s government rhetoric and approach appears to differ from 
the pre-referendum vision is that it is not supported by a majority of the public, leading food 
experts, farmers, food businesses and MPs. In the run up to the referendum, Brexiteers 
promised the public a return to the glory days of the Empire with Britain signing numerous 
FTAs and reemerging as a global trading hub. However, the public were told little of what 
these agreements would consist of and how they would affect their lives, particularly in terms 
of how they might affect food and farming in the UK. The countries highlighted as immediate 
targets for FTAs included the US, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, all of which are 
agricultural powerhouses. The latter three are members of the Cairns group of agricultural 
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exporting countries, who have long sought more access to European markets; Canada has 
recently concluded a FTA with the EU, while New Zealand and Australia are in the process of 
negotiating ones. More access is mostly associated with lowering tariffs. However, in the case 
of the above countries, while tariffs over food could be lowered, the scope for more access 
mostly revolves around food regulation, labelling and recognition of standards.  
The government’s desire to conclude FTAs and make a success of Brexit has the potential of 
testing the public and the food sector’s appetite for changes to current food regulations and 
standards (i.e. non-tariff barriers). FTAs with the above mentioned countries raise concerns for 
many UK dairy and livestock farmers, regarding potential impacts to their livelihood and 
business models from cheaper imports and reduced access to the EU; for example, lamb 
farmers might face competition from cheaper New Zealand lamb imports, while facing 
increased trading barriers and tariffs of around 40 per cent with the EU, which currently buys 
90 per cent of lamb exports. The difficulties of addressing cheaper imports and increased 
trading barriers with the EU would be further exacerbated in the case of a no deal Brexit. The 
National Sheep Association has written an open letter to Prime Minister Johnson stating that 
leaving without a deal would ‘cripple’ their trade and asking for substantial government 
financial and logistical support and the temporary closure of the UK market for sheep meat 
imports.  
The first time issues concerning future FTAs became public was with media reports on what a 
potential UK-US FTA would look like. According to its supporters, a future FTA would 
provide US food exporters with a new market and the British public with increased choice and 
cheaper alternatives. The agreement would save the UK from the EU’s unsustainable ‘museum 
of agriculture’, according to the US Ambassador to the UK, by requiring it to move away from, 
what are perceived to be, antiquated, unnecessary and costly EU regulations.10 To its detractors, 
a UK-US FTA has the potential of introducing controversial food practices and products that 
would harm UK consumers. The particular practices and products that have been highlighted, 
and which are either banned or used in a limited capacity in the EU, include the use of chlorine 
wash as a ‘pathogen reduction treatment’, particularly but not exclusively in poultry; the use 
of growth hormones and antibiotics in livestock, particularly with regard to cattle; the use of 
food additives; and the use of GM crops. It is important to note that these practices and products 
are not limited to the US. The use of chlorine wash for poultry is prevalent in New Zealand; 
much of Australian beef is hormone treated; and GM crops are grown commercially in 
Australia and Canada.  
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With the exception of a handful of committed Brexiteers, such as MEP Daniel Hannan, who 
claimed opposition to chlorinated chicken was concentrated among anti-capitalists who don’t 
eat meat, and the Sun newspaper, which argued that the whole story was ‘baseless panic’, there 
has been a wholesale rejection of the above mentioned products and practices by the general 
public, the media, food businesses and farmers, MPs, and even government ministers. Although 
results vary, a number of surveys conducted by different polling companies indicate clear 
opposition to the introduction of farming products and practices that are currently banned in 
the UK. For example, a rolling survey of consumer attitudes towards food, by the consumer 
group Which?, found that an overwhelming majority (93 per cent) thought it was important to 
maintain current food standards after Brexit; and were opposed to the introduction of hormone 
treated beef (80 per cent), chlorinated chicken (72 per cent) and greater use of GM ingredients 
(64 per cent).11 It is evident from these surveys that there is little demand for the introduction 
of such practices and products in the UK.  
Opposition has also been expressed by a wide range of food and farming bodies. The British 
Poultry Council has stated that they ‘strongly reject any move to import chlorine-washed 
chickens’. The NUF has argued that future FTAs should ‘not serve to allow cheap food imports 
which undermine the high standards that British farmers are proud to produce food to’. The 
UK Food and Drinks Industry’s Plan for Success, written in June 2019, and representing thirty 
food and drink organisations across the supply chain, has called on the government to maintain 
‘a stable and consistent regulatory framework between the UK and EU’ and to commit that 
‘UK food and drink standards will not be sacrificed to secure market access for other 
industries’. In August 2019, the Country Land and Business Association (CLA) and the Tenant 
Farmers Association (TFA), which represent a range of rural and agricultural businesses, have 
called on the government to maintain current standards and to ‘ban the importation of any 
ingredients, intermediate foodstuffs and final foodstuffs produced using techniques banned in 
the UK for the purpose of protecting the environment, animal welfare or for social concerns’. 
Concerns over the lowering of food standards and the introduction of currently banned 
practices and products have also been expressed by leading food experts.12  
Opposition to lower food standards was also expressed by the House of Lords’ EU Committee 
on Brexit in its 2017 report on farm animal welfare, which stated that ‘the greatest threat to 
farm animal welfare standards post-Brexit would come from UK farmers competing against 
cheap, imported food from countries that produce to lower standards than the 
UK’. Interestingly, several Brexit supporting ministers have indicated their opposition, the 
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most prominent being Michael Gove, who has stated on numerous occasions that the UK would 
not accept any lowering of its food standards and would not accept chlorinated chicken. It is 
not a surprise then that opposition to the lowering of standards became the unofficial 
government position, though it has not specified, for diplomatic and political reasons, whether 
it would accept currently banned practices and products as part of future FTAs. 
 
What does Britain want to eat?  
It is clear that so far the government has not attempted to deliver on the Brexiteers’ food 
promises. It has not sought to lower food standards or introduce practices that are currently 
banned. Instead, it has pursued close regulatory alignment with the EU, at least in the short 
term, and promised to maintain and even improve food standards. The question of whether it 
will continue down this path when the UK leaves the EU is still to be seen. 
One of the main problems identified in this article is the lack of a clear overall policy towards 
food post-Brexit. The government has indeed moved away from the Brexiteers’ promises, but 
despite proposing a Green Brexit, no ironclad guarantees have been given, no new regulatory 
bodies have been set up, and no overall policy or legislation have been put forward, other than 
on the issue of farming subsidies. Additionally, there has been little effort to address the main 
food and farming issues the country is facing, many of which would be affected by Brexit.  
As has been shown above, there are several reasons why the government has so far not 
delivered on the Brexit promises. The first and most straight forward is that there has not been 
and is no clear Brexit food policy. The government is stuck in a classic non-decision mode, 
with its decision making process in paralysis. As a result of its non-decision, individual policy 
makers have pursued their own agendas, while paying lip service to the government. On the 
one hand, Gove has pushed for a Green Brexit and raising food standards. On the other hand, 
several ministers, including the Secretary of State for International Trade Liam Fox and Boris 
Johnson have made positive sounds about the potential of a UK-US FTAs and the possibility 
of accepting US produce currently banned in the EU. The second reason for the government’s 
deviation has been the wide range opposition to the ‘Singapore on the Thames’ post-Brexit 
food vision. There appears to be little appetite among the general public, food experts, farmers 
and producers, food charities, and trade bodies, for the introduction of cheap food imports, 
banned food practices and products, and lowering of UK food standards.   
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Where does all this leave the UK? Starting from the position that the UK will leave the EU – 
and with the current levels of uncertainty this is not a given – one could imagine four possible 
post-Brexit scenarios. First, the government might reject the lowering of UK food standards 
and decide to pursue a Green Brexit alongside close regulatory alignment with the EU. While 
this does not sound on the surface as plausible, particularly given the stance taken by Boris 
Johnson, it might be imposed on the UK as the only way of securing British food exports to 
the EU and ensuring an open border in Northern Ireland. While this scenario would provide 
some scope for the UK to set out its own independent food and trade policy, it would leave 
many questioning the logic of leaving the EU in the first place.  
Second, there is little reason to expect that the current levels of indecision and policy making 
paralysis would change in the near term future, regardless of the type of Brexit (soft, hard, or 
no deal). The UK would struggle to come up with coherent solutions to the food challenges it 
faces and would end up with a series of ad-hoc policies that would leave it with a muddled 
approach to food post-Brexit.  
Third, the desire of Brexiteers for wholesale reform to the food sector, by increasing 
productivity, reducing rules and regulations, and bringing down prices, and the pressures from 
food experts, farmers and food bodies, to retain current standards and reject cheap imports, 
might cause the government to appeal to both by adopting, either by design or by default, a 
two-tier food system. This would see the ‘UK produce food at higher standards but import 
cheaper and potentially lower-quality food from countries with reduced welfare or 
environmental standards’.13 This approach might satisfy many Brexiteers, but would bring 
about dramatic structural changes to the UK food sector, while potentially alienating 
consumers, and farmers, who would prefer to maintain a level playing field.  
Fourth, Prime Minister Johnson might decide to make good on the pre-referendum promises 
and his own past statements. He would pursue FTAs with leading food producing countries, a 
looser FTA with the EU, and deregulate and liberalise the UK food sector. This would see the 
introduction of currently banned practices and products and cheaper imports, in the name of 
consumer choice and increased competition and productivity. While a debate could be had on 
the long-term impacts of such an approach, the short-term impact would be dramatic and would 
see whole scale structural changes to the UK’s food and farming sector. It might well achieve 
higher productivity and lower food prices, but the costs could be a race to the bottom in terms 
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of food safety and standards, which might alienate consumers and farmers, and could adversely 
affect public health.   
One thing is clear, whichever approach is adopted post-Brexit, leaving the EU will have an 
immediate, direct and long-lasting impact on consumers and on food in the UK. It is therefore 
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